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The problem of agency nonacquiescence arises because Congress has
charged administrative agencies with policymaking authority and respon-
sibility for a nationally uniform administration of their organic statutes,
while at the same time subjecting the agencies' decisions to review by re-
gional courts of appeals. As developed at length in our article, Nonacqui-
escence by Federal Administrative Agencies,1 we believe that administra-
tive agencies and each of the intermediate appellate courts must be viewed
as participants in a process of national law development in which neither
set of actors has the final say. Rather, they are both key contributors to a
national dialogue designed to improve the decisions of the institutions of
government capable of rendering a national resolution on a particular le-
gal issue-whether it be the courts of appeals themselves by coalescing
around a uniform approach, the Supreme Court, or Congress.2
Because our system has rejected a rule of intercircuit stare decisis in
favor of a process of multicircuit consideration of questions of Federal
law, there are plainly circumstances in which agencies legitimately may
press for national adoption of their policies despite contrary circuit rulings
(what we term in our article intercircuit nonacquiescence and nonacquies-
cence under conditions of venue choice).3 The charge of illegitimacy has
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1. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679
(1989). Our original article grew out of a report prepared at the request of the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States and submitted in August 1988. The views expressed in that article and
this Reply are those of the authors and do not represent the position of the Administrative Conference
or any of its committees.
2. This is not to say that the decisions of a regional court of appeals are without legal effect;
certainly, they bind the parties to the particular dispute and enjoy precedential weight within that
court. Such decisions should be paid respect and may well sow the seeds of a national consensus, but
cannot compel an administrative agency exercising delegated congressional authority and responsible
for the administration of a statute of national application to alter its internal decision-making
processes in a manner contrary to agency policy before the legal system has come to rest in support of
a nationally uniform rule.
3. The National Labor Relations Board has been criticized for its nonacquiescence practice, de-
spite the broad venue provision governing judicial review of its decisions. But the criticism has been
tempered by the fact that the venue choice available to litigants makes it difficult for any one court of
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been levelled where the agency operates under a venue-certain statute and
continues to apply its policy at the administrative level despite a contrary
ruling of the court of appeals that would review the agency action (what
we term intracircuit nonacquiescence).4 In our view, differences in venue
provisions do not alter the functional position of agencies or their contri-
butions to the process of national dialogue. However, intracircuit non-
acquiescence does impose certain costs on those challenging agency action
as well as on the courts, and these costs warrant some measure of judicial
oversight.5 Under general principles of administrative law, the courts of
appeals properly may insist that the agency be embarked on a rational
litigation program designed to secure a reasonably prompt national reso-
lution of the question in dispute.' The courts may not, however, in the
absence of express congressional authorization, act to truncate the dia-
logue by erecting a per se bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence.
In their Comment 7 on our article, two of the lead counsel representing
the plaintiff class in the pending Stieberger v. Sullivan" litigation against
the Social Security Administration (SSA) articulate the view that intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence is per se unlawful and may be routinely subject to
court injunctions regardless of the reasonableness of the agency's litigation
position or the extent of disagreement among the courts of appeals over
the merits of its substantive policy.9 The commentators' argument rests on
two premises that are fundamentally inconsistent with central features of
our Federal legal system. Their conception of the regional courts of ap-
peals as independent, essentially unsupervised fiefdoms reflects a flawed
understanding of the relationship among the Federal courts of appeals,
and between these courts and the Supreme Court. Similarly, their implicit
analogy between administrative agencies and district courts ignores the
well-established view of agencies as the primary policymakers for the stat-
utes that they are empowered to administer. If the case against nonacqui-
escence rests on these grounds, it is a building lacking a viable foundation.
appeals to insist on exclusive superintendence of the agency's orders. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra
note 1, at 682, 710-12.
4. See id. at 682. Intracircuit nonacquiescence can also occur in the face of venue choice, where an
agency's position has been rejected in all circuits that can review a particular decision. See id. at
717-18; infra note 64.
5. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 749-52.
6. See id. at 753-58.
7. Diller & Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A
Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990).
8. No. 84 Civ. 1302 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 24, 1984). For a discussion of the issues raised by the
Stieberger suit, see Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 701-02.
9. Apparently, the commentators do not take issue with our approach to intercircuit non-
acquiescence or to nonacquiescence under conditions of venue choice. See Diller & Morawetz, supra




The commentators urge that intracircuit nonacquiescence can make no
contribution to the process of national dialogue. They posit a world in
which the courts of appeals function as essentially independent court sys-
tems employing a rigid rule of intracircuit stare decisis that renders deci-
sions of three-judge panels largely impervious to developments in other
circuits."0 While acknowledging that disagreements among the circuits oc-
cur with some frequency, they maintain that the Supreme Court lacks the
decisional capacity to resolve those conflicts."' Thus, in their world, in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence cannot play a useful role in promoting the na-
tionally uniform resolution of legal questions. 2
The commentators' description of the system is unsound as a matter of
both theory and practice. If indeed there is no process of national dia-
logue, there can be no sensible explanation for simultaneously insisting
that Federal law is unitary and permitting the courts of appeals to disa-
gree with each other. The commentators' story fails on two levels: first, it
does not account for important features of the judicial landscape; second, it
offers no credible evidence to support their empirical claims about the be-
havior of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.
On the theoretical level, it cannot be plausibly maintained that the
courts of appeals have the status of independent courts representing an
authority sovereign over their geographic territories. Rather, they are in-
termediate courts in a unitary legal system with responsibility over a uni-
tary body of law."3 This point emerges perhaps most vividly in multidis-
trict transfer cases. When diversity cases are transferred (on defendant's
motion) from one Federal court to another, the transferee court is admon-
ished by the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack"' to apply the law of the state
in which the transferor court sits. However, the rule changes in Federal
question cases precisely because no transfer between independent sover-
eign authorities has occurred: the circuit that receives a case applies its
own understanding of Federal law rather than that of the circuit in which
the case was initially filed. 5 The very availability of transfer (as opposed
10. See id. at 804-10.
11. See id. at 809-11.
12. Although the commentators offer criticism of aspects of our balancing of the costs and benefits
of nonacquiescence, see id. at 812-17, they do not appear to believe that the issue is subject to balanc-
ing at all. The benefits of nonacquiescence in promoting dialogue, as they put it, simply "disappear"
once "one recognizes that stare decisis plays a central role in maintaining the stability of law within
the circuits." Id. at 812. All that remains are costs, to be avoided by branding the agency an outlaw
and riding herd over its administrative decisions by means of routine circuit-wide injunctions.
13. See cases cited infra note 18.
14. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
15. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 726 & n.244.
1990]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 831
to dismissal and refiling) between courts in different circuits underscores
that we are dealing with a unitary legal system.16
The commentators are equally wide of the mark when they infer from
the premise that the circuits are formally "not bound" to follow the deci-
sions of other circuits that they are "completely free to accept or reject the
reasoning of other courts of appeals."17 They fail to appreciate that the
opportunity to engage in an independent, reasoned analysis is accompa-
nied by an obligation to respect the views of other circuits and to attempt
to harmonize conflicts."
This obligation flows from the reasons for permitting the courts of ap-
peals to disagree with one another in the first place. 9 The rejection of
intercircuit stare decisis is premised upon-and given the obvious costs in
deferring uniformity,2" is explainable only in terms of-the benefits of
dialogue among the circuits.2 ' In our article, we identified four major ben-
efits of such dialogue. First, the doctrinal dialogue that takes place when
one court of appeals addresses the legal reasoning of another and reaches
a different conclusion is likely to yield a more careful and focused consid-
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1407 (1982).
17. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 805.
18. See, e.g., Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176 (Ginsburg, R.B., J.) ("The federal courts
spread across the country owe respect to each other's efforts and should strive to avoid conflicts, but
each has an obligation to engage independently in reasoned analysis."); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811
F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) ("Bearing in mind the interest in maintaining a reasona-
ble uniformity of federal law and in sparing the Supreme Court the burden of taking cases merely to
resolve conflicts between circuits, we give most respectful consideration to the decisions of the other
courts of appeals and follow them whenever we can."); Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980) ("As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniform-
ity in the law among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding unnecessary
burdens on the Supreme Court docket."); Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Law-
making System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1990).
The courts of appeals have often adopted another circuit's position because of the strong interest in
national uniformity in the application of Federal law. In addition to the authorities cited above, see,
e.g., Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. United States, 825 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Martin v. Heckler,
773 F.2d 1145, 1153 (11th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 764 F.2d 768, 770
(11th Cir. 1985); National Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. EPA, 566 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1977);
North Am. Life & Casualty Co. v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1976); Federal Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 527 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1975).
One circuit has even adopted a local rule that prohibits a panel from creating a conflict with an-
other circuit unless the opinion has been circulated to all active judges and a majority does not request
an en bane rehearing. See 7TH CIR. R. 40(f). For cases applying this rule, see, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 384 n.* (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606
(1985); United States v. Liparota, 735 F.2d 1044, 1044 n.* (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
471 U.S. 419 (1985); King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 488 n.* (7th Cir. 1982). In another circuit, a
similar rule is applied as a matter of court policy. See United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 165 n.*
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984).
19. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 736 & n.275. There were, however, stirrings to-
ward immediate intercircuit uniformity in the early decisions following the Evarts Act of 1891, ch.
517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, which created the courts of appeals. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at
736 & n.275.
20. The commentators appear to recognize the costs of disuniformity among circuits. See Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 7, at 812.
21. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 736; see also cases cited supra note 18 (setting forth
strong interest in uniformity of Federal law).
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eration of the issues.2 Second, the courts of appeals can benefit by observ-
ing the effects of various legal standards. Third, the conflicts produced by
intercircuit dialogue play a useful role in signalling to the Supreme Court
the difficulty of particular legal issues, thereby helping the Court make
better case selection decisions. Fourth, the Supreme Court benefits from
the doctrinal dialogue among the circuits and from the existence of a store
of accumulated experience about the proper formulation and likely conse-
quences of different legal rules." The ultimate goal of such a system of
dialogue is a uniform Federal rule-and a better rule than that which
would have resulted under a rule of intercircuit stare decisis.24
If the Federal judicial system were to operate as the commentators say
it does, the rejection of intercircuit stare decisis would be inexplicable.25
The third and fourth benefits of intercircuit dialogue would largely disap-
pear if the Supreme Court seldom granted certiorari in the face of con-
flicts among the circuits. As to the first and second, unless a circuit reex-
amines its positions in light of contrary decisions by other circuits, it will
not be able to benefit from later rulings by these circuits. Neither will it
be able to provide guidance to circuits that have not yet ruled by explain-
ing either why it is persuaded by the position of the other circuits, or why
it chooses to reaffirm its prior position."
What the commentators are advocating is a system which not only can
never produce a uniform federal law, absent intervention by the Supreme
Court or Congress, but which also skews the law's development in a di-
rection that is always antagonistic to the agency's position. Under their
view, an agency whose position has been rejected in a circuit may not
relitigate in that circuit. However, opponents of the agency not party to
the previous proceeding may continue to press their position in the face of
contrary circuit law. By contrast, intercircuit stare decisis, despite its costs,
would ensure uniformity and avoid this one-way ratchet effect.
22. The commentators assert that most of the benefits of dialogue can be obtained without permit-
ting a circuit to reconsider its prior position. But this view prevents a circuit that has already passed
on a question from benefitting from the views of circuits that rule subsequently, including criticism by
such circuits.
23. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 736-37. For further discussion of the benefits of in-
tercircuit dialogue, see, e.g., S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S
ROI.E 48, 50-52, 73-74 (1986); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163
(1985); Revesz, supra note 18; Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 913, 929 (1983).
24. See R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 163 ("a difficult question is more likely to be answered
correctly if it is allowed to engage the attention of different sets of judges deciding factually different
cases than if it is answered finally by the first panel to consider it").
25. For an endorsement of the route not taken, see Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law:
A Proposal for National Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219 (1978). The
creation of a specialized court to review the decisions of a particular agency, or the adoption of exclu-
sive venue provisions, would have a similar effect. Either alternative, however, would eliminate the
benefits of dialogue. See Revesz, supra note 18.
26. These benefits do not disappear entirely when a circuit is ruling for the first time on an issue,
because it could still benefit from earlier rulings by other circuits.
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Given the far-reaching implications of the commentators' contentions,
which go to the very core of the rejection of intercircuit stare decisis, they
should have the burden of producing strong evidence for their empirical
claims about the functioning of the judicial system-a burden which they
simply fail to discharge.
The commentators provide no support for the proposition that the
Supreme Court is unwilling or unable to harmonize intercircuit conflicts
on questions of Federal statutory law, at least when these conflicts require
a Federal administrative agency to confront different legal rules in differ-
ent circuits. The only empirical support on which they rely is a recent and
comprehensive study of the Supreme Court's exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction. The study's unambiguous and central conclusion is that the
small number of conflicts denied review "undermine[s] the claim that
docket incapacity prevents the Court from resolving conflicts among the
circuits."2 Moreover, only one of the unresolved conflicts28 identified by
this study involved a statutory provision under which the primary poli-
cymaking authority was exercised by an administrative agency. 9
With respect to the courts of appeals, the commentators insist that the
rules for the granting of rehearings en banc do not authorize en banc
review in one circuit merely because its case law has been rejected by
another circuit, and, moreover, require that the underlying issue must be
of "exceptional importance."30 They rely on Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35, which states that a rehearing en banc "is not favored and
ordinarily will not be ordered except . . . when the proceeding involves a
27. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 23, at 103; see also id. at 104, 153-59; Note, The
Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White's Dissents from Denial
of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 610 (1987) (assessing and rejecting Justice
White's claim that a large number of intercircuit conflicts are denied certiorari).
28. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 23, at 153-59. The single conflict was created
by Simpson v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 681 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983), and concerned the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. Simpson held that a 20-year-old Supreme Court precedent, Calbeck v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), applied retroactively to workers who suffered injuries before Calbeck. The
authors of the Supreme Court study deemed the conflict "tolerable" because, given the passage of
time, very few individuals would be affected by the retroactive application of Calbeck. See S. Es-
TREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 23, at 158.
29. The commentators' observation that the Supreme Court's "decisional capacity is small com-
pared to the large number of statutory matters addressed by the courts of appeals," Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 7, at 810, is simply irrelevant to their argument. What matters is whether the
Court lets stand a large number of conflicts involving the interpretation of Federal statutes for which
the primary policymaker is a Federal administrative agency.
The commentators' suggestion that there may be significant undercounting because the Estreicher-
Sexton study is limited to an analysis of conflicts brought to the Court's attention, Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 7, at 810 n.38, is difficult to take seriously. Given the prominence of circuit
conflicts among the considerations supporting a grant of certiorari, as reflected in the Supreme Court's
Rule 17 and any text on Supreme Court practice, the commentators' speculation assumes a high level
of incompetence among a significant number of the Court's practitioners. To our knowledge, nobody
has seriously maintained that an important reason for unresolved conflicts is that certiorari petitions
are failing to identify the presence of conflicts.
30. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 806.
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question of exceptional importance."31 However, it is difficult to under-
stand the suggestion that the harmonization of intercircuit conflicts con-
cerning national regulatory programs is not of such "exceptional impor-
tance" as to deserve the attention of the courts of appeals, given that this
task is "special and important"32 enough to command a central place on
the Supreme Court's docket.33 Indeed, contrary to the commentators' spec-
ulation, the courts of appeals have made quite clear that the issues on
which the circuits are divided ordinarily merit en banc review. 4
The commentators add that even if the issue on which the circuits are
divided is one of "exceptional importance," thereby satisfying their read-
ing of Rule 35, all evidence suggests that the circuits are unlikely to re-
consider the issue en banc. 35 The evidence that they offer is a meaningless
statistic-the percentage of cases resolved by the courts of appeals without
resort to the en banc process. 6 Plainly, the statistic relevant to the com-
mentators' argument is the percentage of cases in which there is a conflict
in the circuits over an issue of "exceptional importance" that are not re-
viewed en banc; on this question, they offer no data at all.
The commentators also claim that under local rules and Rule 35, the
31. FED. R. App. P. 35.
32. Rule 17 states that "review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor." Sup. CT.
R. 17.1. The rule provides, as the first example of "special and important" reasons, "[wihen a Fed-
eral court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another federal court of
appeals on the same matter... ." Id.; see R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT
PRACrHCE § 4.4 (6th ed. 1986).
33. See also Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REV. 29, 51 (1988) ("Supreme
Court Rule 17 . . . is remarkably similar to Federal Appellate Rule 35.").
34. For example, in United States v. Aguon, the Ninth Circuit overruled a prior precedent, noting
that it had become "persuaded to adopt the reasoning" of an intervening decision of the Second Cir-
cuit "in its main points." 851 F.2d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Two concurring judges
indicated that after the Second Circuit had ruled on the question, "with circuit court decisions on both
sides of the issue, it is reasonable for this court to give the matter a closer, more probing examination
than we originally did, even if, as a result, we must acknowledge that our prior decision was in
error." Id. at 1174 (Reinhardt, J., joined by Nelson, J., concurring). Similarly, in United States v.
Missouri*Valley Constr. Co., a panel referred the case to the en banc court because the precedent in
the circuit was inconsistent with the approaches of other circuits. 741 F.2d 1542, 1546 (8th Cir. 1984)
(en banc).
Two circuits have adopted rules expressly stating that intercircuit conflicts merit en banc review. In
the D.C. Circuit, a suggestion for rehearing en banc "shall set forth the reasons why the case is of
exceptional importance or, where applicable, with what decision or decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States, of this Court, or of any other federal appellate court, the panel decision is claimed
to be in conflict." D.C. CIR. R. 15(a)(3) (emphasis added). In the Ninth Circuit, "[w]hen the opinion
of a panel directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another court of appeals and substantially
affects a rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for national uniformity, the
existence of such conflict is an appropriate ground for suggesting a rehearing en banc." 9TH CIR. R.
35-1.
There are occasions where there has been ample multi-circuit consideration of an issue and
Supreme Court review is imminent. In such circumstances, a court of appeals might properly decline
to reconsider its precedent in light of developments elsewhere. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533
F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
35. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 806.
36. See id. at 806 n.23. The commentators use a similarly irrelevant statistic in their discussion of
the Supreme Court's certiorari practice. See supra note 29.
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courts of appeals can overrule precedent only by resort to en banc review,
and that the cumbersome nature of such review makes reconsideration un-
likely." ' But this claim is simply incorrect. For example, in Trapnell v.
United States,38 a panel of the Second Circuit overruled a longstanding
precedent and removed a conflict among the circuits on the proper stan-
dard concerning ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases. The
court simply noted that the opinion had been circulated to all active mem-
bers of the court and that none had requested a rehearing en banc. 9 This
streamlined procedure is hardly more time-consuming for a judge than
reading a slip opinion-which judges do in every case as a matter of
course. The courts of appeals routinely resort to this informal procedure
to overrule prior precedents in light of the case law of other circuits;40
sometimes, as in Trapnell, the overruling of a precedent by a panel re-
sults in the elimination of a conflict.
41
Finally, the commentators fail to present any convincing evidence that
the courts of appeals are, in fact, systematically declining to reconsider
their positions in light of contrary rulings by other circuits. Three cita-
tions are offered: one to a panel ruling reaffirming the validity of an
agency's regulation in the face of intervening contrary rulings of two other
circuits;"2 a second to a decision declining to rehear en banc a panel's
refusal to permit a local district attorney to intervene as of right to upset a
settlement of a class action challenging prison conditions;'3 and a third to
a case in which a divided court of appeals decided by an 8-6 vote not to
grant a rehearing en banc.
44
37. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 805-06.
38. 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983).
39. Id. at 155. One circuit has enacted a rule codifying this approach:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position which would over-
rule a prior decision of this court ... shall not be published unless it is first circulated among
the active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear in bane the issue
of whether the position should be adopted.
71H CIR. R. 40(0. In another circuit, a panel apparently can overrule a prior precedent without the
need even to circulate the opinion before publication. See Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979).
40. See, e.g., Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 456 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Frederick,
835 F.2d 1211, 1214, n.10 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 485 (2d Cir. 1985);
Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kasto, 584
F.2d 268, 272 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); cases cited infra note 41. For
an excellent survey showing that this practice is prevalent, see Bennett & Pembroke, "Mini" In Bane
Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 531 (1986).
41. See, e.g., International Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local 481 v. Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d 499, 502
(7th Cir. 1988); Dornbusch v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1988); Campos v. LeFevre,
825 F.2d 671, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1304 (1988); Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.
2d 917, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1986).
42. See Salmi v. Secretary of HHS, 774 F.2d 685, 689 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1985), cited in Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 7, at 806 n.21.
43. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 611, 612 n.1 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947
(1987), cited in Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 806 n.22.
44. See Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 760 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1054 (1986), cited in Morawetz & Diller, supra note 7, at 806 n.22. In Uviedo, six judges voted to
rehear the case en banc and to depart from the panel's opinion, indicating a willingness of a large
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The empirical support marshalled by the commentators is problematic
for a number of reasons. First, it is unclear from these examples whether
the circuit is unwilling to reconsider precedent because of the constraints
of intracircuit stare decisis or the cumbersome nature of the en banc pro-
cess, rather than because it agrees on the merits with the prior approach
of the circuit. Only instances of the former lend support to the claim that
intercircuit dialogue does not occur. Second, because the legitimacy of in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence turns on the responsibility of a Federal admin-
istrative agency to maintain a nationally uniform administration of its
statute, for a case to count at all it should be one in which some agency of
the Federal government is a party-the district attorney example is there-
fore wholly inapposite. We also believe, although the point is somewhat
closer, that cases in support of the commentators' position should also be
ones in which a circuit declines to reconsider a prior ruling rejecting an
agency's position that has been upheld in other circuits. Only in such in-
stances is the circuit forced to choose between precedent and agency pol-
icy. Third, although we are certain that the commentators could find
somewhat better examples if they were pressed to do so, isolated examples
hardly establish a principle, particularly in light of the contrary evi-
dence.45 Finally, even if the commentators could carry the burden of
showing that the courts of appeals are not reconsidering precedent in light
of contrary decisions in other circuits, this would argue, at most (on the
assumption that the commentators do not desire intercircuit stare decisis),
for encouraging the courts to engage in such reconsideration through pro-
cedures less cumbersome than en banc review.'
II.
The commentators' position is also based on an implicit analogy be-
tween administrative agencies and district courts. They believe that the
rules of precedent make the decisions of a court of appeals as binding on
administrative agencies (at least with respect to agency decisions that will
be reviewed in that circuit) as they are on the district courts. They state
that the lower Federal courts, like the Supreme Court, "do[] not simply
issue narrowly framed orders which bind the parties to a case, but also
group within the circuit to depart from precedent. See 760 F.2d at 88. The eight judges that voted
against the rehearing may well have done so because they believed that the precedent was correct and
therefore that en banc review would serve no purpose. Moreover, the Supreme Court eventually re-
solved the conflict at issue in that case. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School
Dist., 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
45. See cases cited supra notes 18, 34.
46. For an example of such procedures, see supra notes 39-41; Bennett & Pembroke, supra note
40. The strategy of the commentators is to leave all elements of the legal system fixed, however
flawed, save the rules governing intracircuit nonacquiescence. Such a strategy may be proper for
lawyers advocating the cause of clients. But if the world is as the commentators believe it to be, they
should be advocating either (i) easier en banc procedures or (ii) intercircuit stare decisis. Perpetual
balkanization of Federal regulatory statutes simply makes no sense as a policy matter.
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announce[] declarations of law binding on the executive branch through
precedential effect."
4 7
As we develop further in our article, it is a fundamental error to con-
ceive of the relationship between an agency and its reviewing court in the
same hierarchical terms as the relationship between a district court and its
appellate court.48 Administrative agencies are not merely factfinders that
apply the law developed by the courts of appeals. In the administrative
state ushered in by the New Deal, agencies have been delegated authority
by Congress to develop coherent, nationally uniform policies under their
statutes. They are more a part of the policymaking, politically accountable
branches of government than they are a part of the system of adjudication.
Justice Frankfurter put the point well in his opinion for the Court in
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.:"'
A much deeper issue, however, is here involved. This was not a
mandate from court to court but from a court to an administrative
agency. What is in issue is not the relationship of Federal courts
inter se-a relationship largely defined by the courts them-
selves-but the due observance by courts of the distribution of au-
thority made by Congress as between its power to regulate commerce
and the reviewing power which it has conferred upon the courts
under Article III of the Constitution. . . . The technical rules de-
rived from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals forming a hier-
archical system are taken out of their environment when mechani-
cally applied to determine the extent to which Congressional power,
exercised through a delegated agency, can be controlled within the
limited scope of "judicial power" conferred by Congress under the
Constitution.5"
Justice Frankfurter added:
But to assimilate the relation of these administrative bodies and the
courts to the relationship between lower and upper courts is to disre-
gard the origin and purposes of the movement for administrative reg-
ulation and at the same time to disregard the traditional scope, how-
ever far-reaching, of the judicial process. Unless these vital
differentiations between the functions of judicial and administrative
tribunals are observed, courts will stray outside their province and
read the laws of Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplica-
ble legal doctrine.5
The commentators do not squarely address our rejection of the district
47. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 822.
48. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 723-25.
49. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
50. Id. at 141.
51. Id. at 144.
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court analogy even though this analogy is the unstated governing premise
of their invocation of supposed Article III limitations on intracircuit non-
acquiescence. Instead, they resort to mischaracterizing our reliance on
Chevron v. NRDC.5" Chevron does reflect the broad principle, on which
our analysis is based, that agencies are in a position fundamentally differ-
ent from district courts because they have been delegated policymaking
responsibility by Congress and because they derive their legitimacy, at
least in part, from their accountability to the political process.
53
Chevron also states that broad deference should be accorded to an
agency's constructions of its governing statute.5" In our rejection of the
district court analogy, however, we refer to Chevron deference only as an
example of the different legal requirements that apply to district courts
and administrative agencies.55 We of course do not argue that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is legitimate simply because an agency has chosen to
nonacquiesce and the Federal courts are bound by Chevron to defer to
that choice. Indeed, such a position would be inconsistent with our conclu-
sion that intracircuit nonacquiescence is permissible only for the limited
time in which Federal law on the subject is in flux and the agency is
making reasonable attempts to persuade the courts to validate its posi-
tion.56 Instead, in our view, the legitimacy of intracircuit nonacquiescence
flows from the congressional choice of administrative government and
from the judicial system's commitment to intercircuit dialogue.
The commentators also maintain that we allow "agencies to double dip
on their Chevron rights to deference ... [because] even after a court has
granted an agency the deference owed under Chevron, it must further stay
its hand in enjoining what the court has found to be an unwarranted exer-
cise of agency power."5 7 The problem that the commentators do not recog-
52. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For the commentators' characterization, see Diller & Morawetz, supra
note 7, at 818-21.
53. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 723-25. The commentators mistakenly assert that
Chevron deference is premised exclusively on agency expertise. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7,
at 818-19. As justice Stevens stated in Chevron:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
467 U.S. at 865-66; see Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 COLuM. L. Rev. 452, 456 (1989). Given the fact that SSA is in the executive branch,
it is clearly covered by the ruling in Chevron. Independent agencies also display a measure of respon-
siveness to the political process that justifies Chevron-like deference.
54. 467 U.S. at 842-44.
55. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 723-25.
56. See id. at 753.
57. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 821.
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nize is that a single administrative agency, charged with nationwide re-
sponsibility, comes into contact with many regional courts, which can and
do disagree on the question of the permissibility of the agency's statutory
construction. While a single court of appeals can settle the rights of par-
ties to a lawsuit, it should not be able to unilaterally stymie the prospects
for uniformity in administration of Federal law while an agency is rea-
sonably attempting to obtain the nationwide validation of its position.
This brings us to the commentators' rather breezy assertion that in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence is destructive of "the Article III function of is-
suing binding declarations of law.""8 At times, they appear to be arguing
that the ordinary rules of statutory construction should be suspended, and
that intracircuit nonacquiescence requires "express" congressional author-
ization. 9 At other times, they appear to state that intracircuit nonacquies-
cence would be unconstitutional regardless of congressional authoriza-
tion.6 1 One searches in vain, however, for a proper Article III predicate
supporting either invocation of the clear statement techniquee or an out-
right declaration of constitutional invalidity.
Ultimately, their constitutional claim, however formulated, rests on the
very same premises that bracketed their dismissal of the policy justifica-
tions for intracircuit nonacquiescence-that the courts of appeals may le-
gitimately function as insular judicial systems and that administrative
agencies occupy a subordinate position in the regional hierarchy of legal
authority headed by these courts. Because those premises are flawed, the
commentators have presented no case for constitutional invalidation. 2
58. Id. at 823.
59. See id. at 822, 824.
60. See id. at 823.
61. For an application of the clear statement technique, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
See also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Su-
preme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982).
62. Professor Joshua Schwartz' recent article, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Admin-
istrative Adjudication, 77 Gao. L.J. 1815 (1989), attempts to root a qualified bar to intracircuit
nonacquiescence in a "judicial review theory" based on Article III. The article suggests that adminis-
trative adjudication can be reconciled with the constitutional allocation of "the judicial Power of the
United States" to Article III courts only by ensuring that such courts are available to review agency
factfinding and to ensure conformity with governing law, and that in the case of "routine intracircuit
nonacquiescence, conventional judicial review is not an adequate safeguard for the integrity of the
judicial power." Id. at 1851. This is not the place for a full-dress response to Professor Schwartz'
effort; however, there are some obvious difficulties with the position. First, the argument is based on a
reading of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), that requires a rejection of the Crowell Court's
recognition of an exception for "public rights" claims-claims defined as those that "arise between the
government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of constitutional
functions of the executive or legislative departments." Id. at 50. Our argument does not depend on the
"public rights" doctrine, but a theory based on Crowell, such as Schwartz', must account for the case's
central distinction between public and private rights. Second, even if it is assumed that Article III
requires some review by Federal judges with life tenure of all adjudications under Federal law-a
proposition much debated in the literature but which we endorse-Professor Schwartz has difficulty
explaining why this residual Article III check is not satisfied by the availability of Supreme Court
review. Certainly, the state courts adjudicate questions of Federal law without superintendence by the
Federal courts of appeals. Under our view, of course, Federal courts would retain their authority to




The commentators are driven to their conclusion, to a great extent, by
their mistaken belief that SSA is "essentially unique""3 in engaging in
intracircuit nonacquiescence. This assertion ignores the fact that other
agencies, notably the Internal Revenue Service, also operate under a statu-
tory scheme in which there is essentially no venue choice, and have en-
gaged in similar practices.64 Admittedly, most statutes provide a degree of
venue choice that makes less prominent the disagreements of agencies with
their reviewing courts."5 But it is the invariable move of opponents of
intracircuit nonacquiescence to endow venue provisions-which as far as
we can discern are placed in statutes to promote litigation conve-
nience"6-with profound structural significance. The commentators' re-
peated appeal to the "rule of law" would dissolve were the Social Security
Act amended to provide for the range of venue choice characteristic of
modern regulatory statutes. As discussed in our article, we advocate the
elimination of venue choice under many statutory schemes, in part be-
cause we believe that the restraining influence of judicial review of admin-
istrative action should not depend on the nature of the venue provision."
If Congress heeds our recommendation, a proper understanding of the le-
gitimacy of intracircuit nonacquiescence will become even more important
than it is now.
Even the commentators concede that the cost-benefit calculus concern-
ing nonacquiescence is different outside of the Social Security context.6 8
It is thus misleading to make general pronouncements about intracircuit
nonacquiescence, as the commentators do, based simply upon an analysis
of SSA. And, absent an explicit statutory directive, we do not see how
intracircuit nonacquiescence can be per se illegal for SSA if it is not for
other agencies as well. As we state in our article, however, if the statutory
scheme or the Supreme Court's due process and equal protection jurispru-
argument applies by its terms only to agencies that utilize formal adjudication as a mode of decision-
making, for only such agencies can be said to operate as "judicial assistants" to Article III tribunals.
It seems perverse that agencies functioning through informal processes, lacking trial-type safeguards,
escape both the Article III checking mechanism and the qualified prohibition of intracircuit nonacqui-
escence. Finally, the argument belies a conception of administrative agencies as surrogate factfinders
for courts that flies in the face of established understandings of the role of agencies in the modern
regulatory state.
63. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 801 n.1.
64. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 713. We state in our article that the IRS engages in
intercircuit nonacquiescence as a matter of course, and that it engages in intracircuit nonacquiescence
"less frequently." Id. Moreover, intracircuit nonacquiescence is not limited to agencies that operate
under venue-certain schemes. When there is venue choice, an agency nonetheless engages in intracir-
cuit nonacquiescence when it reaffirms a position that has been rejected in all circuits in which review
of the agency decision is possible. Our survey of Federal agencies indicates that several agencies
engage in such conduct. See id. at 717-18.
65. See id. at 764, 770.
66. See id. at 767-68.
67. See id. at 764-70.
68. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 7, at 816-17.
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dence evinces a particularly strong concern over distributional effects, as
might be the case for SSA, the process of intracircuit nonacquiescence can
be truncated more rapidly than might otherwise be the case.6"
Notwithstanding the commentators' description of the special character-
istics of SSA disability claimants, Congress in 1984, after extensive con-
sideration of the question, declined to prohibit SSA nonacquiescence poli-
cies.70 The courts of appeals lack the authority to erect an absolute
proscription simply because SSA administers a venue-certain statute.
Questions about the proper institutional relationships between agencies
and reviewing courts should not be resolved in terms of the specific
problems that SSA claimants faced in the early 1980's. A feature of our
administrative state is that agencies tend to be more responsive to the pref-
erences of current majorities, while judges, most of whom were appointed
during previous administrations, tend to hold views more consonant with
past majorities. In the 1930's, administrative agencies were viewed as en-
gines of populist social change; the courts represented the vanguard of a
conservative reaction. In the current political climate, the roles are some-
what reversed. Litigators, like the commentators, find themselves in com-
bat with budget-sensitive, market-oriented agency decisionmakers, and
hope to obtain relief from more liberal judges. In time, the political pen-
dulum will swing again, and we may well find activist agencies bridled by
conservative judges. The rules governing agency nonacquiescence should
not change with the political winds.
69. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 1, at 757.
70. See id. at 703-04.
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